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CONCEPTUALIZING THE RIGHT OF ACCESS TO
TECHNOLOGY*
Morton J. Horwitzt
I begin with the assumption that my assigned task today is not to
defend or justify a wider distribution of access to technology. I accept
that as a given. For if that were not true, long years of professorial
training in law would lead me, in a Pavlovian manner, to ponder the
limits of wider access to technology-its possible negative effects on
children or its easy access to the gullible and the innocent, who might
become easy prey to the financial and sexual predators among us.
Fortunately, my task is more confined. Accepting that a wider
distribution of access to technology is, like wider access to education in
general, a social good that is usually to be applauded and promoted, my
role is not to defend a broader access to technology but rather to suggest
the ways in which an advocate might invoke legal categories and
concepts in order to advance that goal. By focusing on legal categories, I
should emphasize, I wish to slide past any general moral argument about
the injustice of the overall distribution of wealth and how a more just
distribution could most efficaciously solve many special problems of
unequal access to technology. I am sure that that is true, but you did not
have me fly out from Boston to tell you that. Rather, I hope to take on
the more limited task of asking whether there are ways of framing the
question of access to technology in primarily legal terms.
Beginning our legal inquiry at the most general level, we need first to
underline the important ideological difference between the governing
assumptions of the U.S. constitutional system and of the constitutional
regimes established in most Western European countries after World
War II. These post-War constitutions, often called second-generation
constitutions in contrast to the eighteenth century American
Constitution, express a commitment to the notion of a positive state, a
state with affirmative obligations to promote welfare and full

. Remarks made at Technology, Values, and the Justice System, a symposium held on January 1617, 2004 at the University of Washington School of Law.
t Charles Warren Professor of American Legal History, Harvard Law School.
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employment.' These constitutions derived either from European social
democratic thought or from the positive liberalism of turn of the century
British and American philosophers like T.H. Green and John Dewey.2
By contrast, the prevailing view of the U.S. Constitution is that its
pronouncements are largely negative 3 and meant only to prevent
government from overstepping its bounds, not positive, thereby creating
constitutional duties in the government to maximize the welfare of the
citizenry.4 In the standard formulation, the American Constitution
embodies eighteenth century ideas of freedom from external restraint;
the twentieth century Western European constitutions, by contrast,
express the idea that real human freedom derives from the maximization
of the talents and abilities of the citizenry and that the state is
constitutionally obliged to promote social conditions that favor the
expansion of positive liberty.5
This contrast between "freedom from" and "freedom to" is replicated
in many more technical areas of the law. In that esoteric corner of tort
law dealing with "no duty," one is struck by the difference between
Europe and America over the duty to rescue. Let us look at the generic
example of the baby lying face down in a puddle, as a stranger cynically
walks by, though he could easily have saved the infant. One may be
surprised to learn that in the United States there is no duty to rescue the
baby, while in most European countries such a duty does exist,
6
sometimes extending even to criminal liability.
My point is that the distinction between positive and negative duties
extends all the way from top to bottom, from constitutional to tort law,
as a fundamental expression of the difference between European legal
culture and ours. The American attitude is derived from a culture of
rugged individualism and an antipathy to the state. It often rejects ideals

1. Mary Ann Glendon, Rights in Twentieth Century Constitutions,59 U. CHI. L. REV. 519, 521
(1992).
2. See JAMES T. KLOPPENBERG, UNCERTAIN VICTORY: SOCIAL DEMOCRACY AND
PROGRESSIVISM IN EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN THOUGHT, 1870-1920, at 397 (1986); T.H. Green,
Liberal Legislation and Freedom of Contract, in WORKS OF THOMAS HILL GREEN (R.L. Nettleship
ed., 1893); JOHN DEWEY, THE PUBLIC AND ITS PROBLEMS (1927).

3. Gerhard Casper, Changing Concepts of Constitutionalism:18th to 20th Century, 1989 SUP. CT.
REV. 311,320.
4. Id.
5. MAURO CAPPELLETTI, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 237-38 (1989).
6. Edward A. Tomlinson, The FrenchExperience with Duty To Rescue, 20 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 451,451-52 (2000).
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of social solidarity, especially when they can only be achieved through
enforcement or facilitation by the state as an agent of society.
I began at this level of abstraction in order to highlight the long
standing cultural and constitutional obstacles to finding affirmative
duties in the law. That does not mean that these obstacles cannot be
overcome, but only that legal advocates who strive to craft a right of
access to technology need to realize that they are swimming upstream
against a vigorous counter current.
At a less abstract, more manageable level of legal discourse, I see four
areas of the law that offer promising analogies: the right to education,
the right to language, the right to tools, and the right to property. Let me
take them up, one at a time. Each of these four rights offers the
possibility of analogizing a right of access to technology to a
fundamental or near fundamental right already recognized by our legal
system.
I.

THE RIGHT TO EDUCATION

The broadest and most commonsensical claim would treat a denial of
access to technology as equivalent to placing an undue burden on the
right to education itself. The strongest version would assert that just as
the state has a duty to establish public schools, so too it has a duty to
guarantee certain minimum conditions-from adequate books and other
learning materials to a physically safe and healthy environmentnecessary to keep the basic right to education from being undermined in
the first place.
But the current state of the law relating to a constitutional right to
education is more complex. Any claim to a strong federal constitutional
right to education was defeated in the United States Supreme Court case
of San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez. In that case,
the Court upheld a system of public school financing based on widely
unequal local property taxes against an Equal Protection attack.8 But
even as it was denying the strong claim, the Court did allude to the
possibility that an absolute minimum of educational benefits might be
constitutionally required. 9 It conceded arguendo that "some identifiable
quantum of education is a constitutionally protected prerequisite" to the

7. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).

8. Id. at 54-55.
9. Id. at 36-37.
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"meaningful exercise" of the duties of citizenship, and it acknowledged
that the plaintiffs might have a valid claim "if a State's financing system
occasioned an absolute denial of educational opportunities to any of its
children." 10 The Court suggested that the case might have come out
differently if a "charge could fairly be made that the system fails to
provide each child with an opportunity to acquire the basic minimal
skills necessary for the enjoyment of
the rights of speech and of full
'1
participation in the political process." I
Despite these concessions, after Rodriquez, the claim that unequal
funding between poor and rich school districts violates Equal Protection
shifted to the states under their own equal protection clauses. However,
one other subsequent Supreme Court decision did find that it was an
Equal Protection violation for Texas to refuse public education to
children of illegal aliens.' 2 Though constrained by the Rodriquez
decision holding that public education was not a fundamental
constitutional right, the Court formulated what Professor Tribe calls "a
hybrid equal protection test" that highlighted, not a "fundamental right"
to education but rather the "fundamental
role" education plays "in
'3
society."'
our
of
fabric
the
maintaining
What scholars have called the "second wave" of school finance
reform litigation, which involved claims brought under state
constitutions, began after Rodriguez was decided in 1973. In the same
year, the New Jersey Supreme Court initiated the second wave by
invoking provisions of the New Jersey constitution to strike down the
state's system of educational funding. 14 The second wave of litigation
had some success but more frequent failure, and as time passed, success
15
became a rarity as failures predominated.
The waning success of state equal protection decisions recognizing
plaintiffs' fundamental right to equal education gave way to a "third
wave" during the 1990s that focused not on inequality but on whether a

10. Id.
11. Id. at 37.

12. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982).
13. 2 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1444-82 (2d ed. 1988).
14. Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973).
15. William E. Thro, The Third Wave: The Impact of the Montana, Kentucky, and Texas
Decisions on the Future of Public School Finance Reform Litigation, 19 J.L. & EDUC. 219, 232
(1990); see Molly McUsic, The Use of Education Clauses in School Finance Reform Litigation, 28
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 307, 314 (1991).
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child had received "an adequate education."' 6 "Although often coupled
with equal opportunity claims, the third wave's hallmark is challenging7
1
the adequacy of education rather than the equality of financing."'
Plaintiffs turned away from state equality clauses and framed their
claims under other state constitutional provisions. One group of state
constitutions specifies explicit quality standards for public education.
The Illinois constitution, for example, declares that "[a] fundamental
goal of the People of the State is the educational development of all
persons to the limits of their capacities."1 8 It requires the state to
"provide for an efficient system of high quality public educational
institutions and services."' 9
Montana requires an educational system that "will develop the full
educational potential of each person., 20 The Virginia constitution
requires the legislature to "ensure that an educational program of high
quality is established and continually maintained.",2' Louisiana must
provide learning experiences that are "humane, just and designed to
promote excellence in order that every individual may be afforded an
equal opportunity to develop to his full potential. 22
The Washington constitution requires that the state make "ample
provision" for the education of all children. 23 In one of the first "third
wave" standards cases, the Washington State Supreme Court in 1978
held that the clause was not a mere suggestion but a specific duty
imposed on the legislature. 24 After defining the constitutional word
"ample" as "liberal, unrestrained, without parsimony, fully, [and]
sufficient," 25 the court found that the state's constitutional duty
"embraces broad educational opportunities needed in the contemporary

16. William F. Dietz, Manageable Adequacy Standards in Education Reform Litigation, 74
WASH. U. L.Q. 1193, 1200 (1996).
17. William Kent Packard, A Sound, Basic Education: North Carolina Adopts an Adequacy
Standardin Leandro v. State, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1481, 1499 (1998).
18. ILL. CONST. art. 10, § 1.
19. Id.

20. MONT. CONST. art. X, § 1.
21. VA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1.
22. LA. CONST. art. ViII pmbl.
23. WASH. CONST. art. ix, § 1.
24. Seattle
Sch. Dist. No. I v. State, 90 Wash. 2d 476, 585 P.2d 71 (1978).
25. Id. at 516, 585 P.2d at 93.
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setting to equip our children for their role as citizens and as potential
competitors in today's market as well as in the marketplace of ideas. 26
There are, of course, many other state constitutional provisions that
are either weaker or vaguer than the ones just considered. In one of these
states, North Carolina, there is a remarkable decision under a relatively
weak constitutional provision. The North Carolina constitution requires
that the legislature support "a general and uniform system of free public
schools.., wherein equal opportunities shall be provided for all
students. 27 In Leandro v. State,28 the North Carolina Supreme Court
held that all children are entitled to the same minimum qualitative level
of education, regardless of which schools the children attend. 29 The court
found that the North Carolina constitution guarantees a "sound basic
education., 30 The court also found that "an education that does not serve
the purpose of preparing students to participate and compete in the
society in which they live and work is devoid of substance and is
constitutionally inadequate.",31 A "sound basic education," the court said,
consists of the opportunity to develop the following four skills: (1)
sufficient ability to read, write, and speak English, and a fundamental
knowledge of mathematics and physical science; (2) a fundamental
knowledge of geography, history, and basic economic and political
systems; (3) sufficient skills to enable students to engage successfully in
further education or vocational training; and (4) sufficient skills to allow
students to 32compete equally with others in further education or
employment.
The North Carolina legislature has actually passed a statute that
defines a "sound basic education" to include "the areas of the arts,
communication skills, physical education and personal health and safety,
mathematics, media and computer skills, science, second
languages,
33
social studies, and vocational and technical education.,
This third wave shift to adequacy standards has brought into view a
large variety of state constitutional provisions that are much better suited
to the task of establishing a right of access to technology than the more
26. Id. at 517, 585 P.2d at 94.
27. N.C. CONST. art. IX, § 2.

28. 488 S.E.2d 249 (N.C. 1997).
29. Id. at 254.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 255.
33. See Packard, supra note 17, at 1507-08 (emphasis added).
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potentially sweeping equality provisions: Moreover, because, unlike the
federal government, states have plenary power over education, there are
many state constitutional and statutory provisions recognizing the sort of
broad affirmative duties in the state that are as sweeping as those I
identified at the outset with post-World War II second-generation
European constitutions.
II.

THE RIGHT TO LANGUAGE

For many courts, however, we are still in need of a narrower analogy
than the right to education provides. Perhaps the analogy between access
to technology and language rights provides a still tighter fit. The United
States Supreme Court has held that children whose mother tongue is not
English have a right to learn English, and the public schools have a duty
to provide the opportunity to achieve literacy in English.34 We have just
seen that many states have established an affirmative duty to attain
literacy in English.35
It is not difficult to conceive of access to information technology as
access to a new kind of primary language that, like English, is an
indispensable prerequisite for becoming a full participant in modern
society and economy. In order for one to be actually in a position to
learn and grow in twenty-first century America, access to the language
of technology seems no less fundamental than access to knowledge of
the English language itself.
The analogy between language and information technology has the
great advantage of narrowing the right to education argument and of
steering it away from the always potentially lethal slippery slope of an
affirmative duty of equality. Instead, the analogy focuses on access to a
more limited class of language skills that can be said to provide a unique
window into participation in the culture. There might be arguments
about whether there are other competitors such as mathematics, the
sciences, or economics that actually do perform as fundamental a
gatekeeping role as the primary language of the culture. My assumption
is that the strongest claimant, after English itself, to the status of a
primary language that controls access to the world is the language of
information technology.

34. Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 568 (1974).
35. See supra notes 18-33 and accompanying text.
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What do I mean when I speak of access to information technology?
How do we contain the potentially overbroad meanings that might sink
the whole enterprise? For example, a right of access to information
technology might range all the way from the claim that the state needs to
provide students with their own computers to the narrower claim that
every school needs to make children familiar with the workings of a
computer. A requirement of computer "literacy" might be an
intermediate goal, and it might be tested in the same ways as we measure
literacy in ordinary language.
To apply the idea of a right of access to technology in a different
setting, let us shift from the school to the criminal justice system. In
many parts of the country, criminal defense attorneys have substantially
less access to expensive computer research than do state-funded
prosecutors. One way to think about the problem might be first to
recognize that the constitutional right to counsel does not include a
guarantee that defendants must be represented by equally skilled or welltrained lawyers. Except for very wealthy defendants, our criminal justice
system regularly ignores the dramatic asymmetry in resources between
prosecutors and defendants. Only when the quality of the defendant's
representation falls below the standard of "adequacy" does the law step
in to correct the imbalance.
It would not be far fetched to claim that access to computer legal
research should be an important element in judging the adequacy of a
lawyer's defense. Would that also be true if the defense lawyer were a
computer illiterate who had access to a complete print collection of legal
materials? If we have permitted major inequalities between the state and
the defense in their access to print materials, is there any reason why we
should require more equality in access to computer technology?
The claim that lack of access to computer research is different in kind
from many other kinds of inadequate lawyering may be hard for a court
to swallow. The existing legal standard encourages judges to look the
other way except in the most egregious cases of inadequate
representation. To create a kind of per se rule that elevates access to
information technology to a preeminent position in measuring adequate
lawyering might easily create the sort of slippery slope paranoia that sees
access to computer information as the entering wedge in a more radical
effort to equalize lawyering.
If I had a better grasp of both the full range and the complexities of
current technological possibilities, I might be able to spin out even more
mind-boggling choices between broad and narrow versions of the
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meaning of the right of access to information technology. The important
point, however, is to stay close to the basic idea that in our culture, both
language and information technology uniquely control and structure our
ability to learn about and participate in the world.
III.

THE RIGHT TO TOOLS

If either education or language rights fail as analogies either because
they are not intuitively compelling or because they threaten to lead to
overbroad conclusions, a third set of analogies might prove more
compelling. It begins by conceiving of access to information technology
as a tool, both literally and metaphorically. In the literal sense, one
would want to draw on the underlying policy contained in state statutes
that exempt mechanics' tools from seizure in debt or bankruptcy
proceeding. These statutes, adopted in most states after the Revolution,
were based on the sensible idea that if workers' tools could be seized,
workers would be deprived of the very means of staying out of
insolvency in the future.36 Our interest in tools as an analogy is that it
expresses the idea that the acquisition of certain things like "tools" may
be specially protected because they are regarded as a prerequisite to
workers participating in a market economy without losing all of their
actual autonomy or agency.
To extend this analogy, can books be thought of as tools? Are there
similar exemptions for, say, the professional library of a doctor, lawyer,
minister, or teacher? 37 From books, it would be a short step to including
information technology in the privileged circle of tools.
IV. THE RIGHT TO PROPERTY
I have saved for last the most prominent way in which contemporary
legal discourse structures the question of a right of access to information

36. See 3-4 ANNUAL LAW REGISTER OF THE UNITED STATES (William Griffith ed., 1822)

(establishing that by the 1820s, two-thirds of the states had already enacted statutory provisions that
exempted the tools of one's trade from execution in bankruptcy).
37. See id. at 503, 664, 681-82, 991 (establishing that by the 1820s, four states exempted books
from execution in bankruptcy: Louisiana ("books of professional men"); Maine and Massachusetts
("bibles and school books"); Mississippi ("books of a student")); see also Bernard R. Trujillo, The
Wisconsin Exemption Clause Debate of 1846: An HistoricalPerspective on the Regulation of Debt,
1998 Wis. L. REv. 747, 757 (1998) (noting that the first version, not adopted, of Wisconsin's

Exemption Clause in its 1846 Constitution provided for a $500 exemption from taxation and
execution of, inter alia, mechanics tools, farming utensils, and professor's books).

Washington Law Review

Vol. 79:105, 2004

technology. In a word, the discussion overwhelmingly centers on
questions of property rights. A right of access is conceived of as the
reciprocal of the right to property. By determining the property rights of
companies that sell music on CDs, you also determine the absence of
any property rights in those who wish to download that music for free on
Napster. By expanding the scope of intellectual property rights, courts
have thus reduced access to information technology. A clear example is
the "fair use" exception to the claim of infringement in the copyright
law. As the scope of property rights expands-in this case, as the fair use
exception is narrowed-access to technology is less possible.
My colleague, William Fisher, has written a short history of
intellectual property law, by tracing the evolution of its different
technical branches--copyright, patents, unfair competition, trademarks,
trade secrets, business goodwill. Fisher has concluded that a substantial
expansion of property rights has occurred in the recent past, say since
World War II, especially as each of these sub-fields, with their own
specialized sub-rules, have been blended into a new, more generalized
and abstract generic category known as intellectual property. 38 Fisher
sees the expansion of intellectual property rights as deriving from both
changes in the economy-the shift from an agricultural to industrial to
information-based society-as well as significant early ideological
commitments to a Lockean labor (just deserts) theory of property.
Important cultural factors he identifies as supporting the expansion of
intellectual property rights are the Romantic ideal of authorship and the
image of the inventor as a creative genius. Finally, he identifies a gradual
shift in legal terminology that has recently created the generic field of
intellectual property, which has contributed to the "propertization" of the
field. For example, in many of these fields expansive language of
property rights has displaced the traditional discourse of limited
monopoly, which had placed a stronger burden on the property-claiming
plaintiff.
It seems to me that, for better or for worse, the immediate battle over
access to technology will continue to be framed primarily as a question
of property rights. Therefore, it is necessary for advocates of increased

38. William W. Fisher III, Geistiges Eigentum--ein ausufernder Rechtsbereich: Die Geschichte
des Ideenschutzes in den Vereinigten Staaten [The Growth of Intellectual Property: A History of the
Ownership of Ideas in the United States], in EIGENTUM IM INTERNATIONALEN VERGLEICH 265
(Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1999), http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/people/tfisher/iphistory.pdf (English
translation); see also William Fisher III, Theories of Intellectual Property, in NEW ESSAYS IN THE
LEGAL AND POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY 166 (Stephen R. Munzer ed., 2000).
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access to be fully attuned to the possibility of expanding access by
limiting the scope of property rights. Or, to put the matter more
precisely, even when the issue of access is framed as a question of
property, there is no reason to concede that property rights are absolute.
While the rhetoric of property rights since the 1980s has increasingly
taken on an absolutist spin, in actuality, most traditional conceptions of
property rights already have incorporated traditional limitations that had
been originally created out of a sense of the public interest.39 A familiar,
albeit special, example is the fair use defense in copyright. Against a
constitutional background that posited that the grant of a copyright was a
limited privilege created in the public interest for the purpose of
encouraging the dissemination of useful knowledge, it was relatively
easy to conceive of a fair use exception as included within the statutory
definition of the copyright grant. In other areas of property law, because
the limitations on the use of property are more deeply embedded in the
technical law and thus less visible, one finds more unrestrained use of
the rhetoric of absolute property rights.
In fact, even the most absolute-sounding subject of trespass to land
can be shown to be riddled with exceptions. From the Supreme Court's
reluctance during the Civil Rights Era to enforce the trespass laws
against civil rights demonstrators engaged in sit-ins at segregated private
facilities to state courts entertaining the defense of necessity put forth by
activists protesting against the dangers from nuclear power facilities, we
see the malleability of property rights when defenses of necessity or of
an implied public easement are used to limit the absolutist sound of
trespass.
It is necessary to dwell a moment more on trespass not only because it
is often misleadingly deployed to symbolize the absoluteness of property
claims but also because it has been increasingly invoked by courts as a
central basis for limiting access to information technology. Not only is
the hacker found to be a trespasser even without proof of the high degree
of intentionality that suing in trespass often requires, but trespass has
been deployed to enjoin a former employee from writing emails to his

39. GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, COMMODITY AND PROPERTY: COMPETING VISIONS OF PROPERTY
IN AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT (1997); WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE'S WELFARE: LAW AND
REGULATION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (1996); JOSEPH W. SINGER, THE EDGES OF THE
FIELD-LESSONS ON THE OBLIGATIONS OF OWNERSHIP (2000); JOSEPH W. SINGER, ENTITLEMENT:

THE PARADOXES OF PROPERTY (2000).
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ex-colleagues critical of his former employer. 40 Despite important First
Amendment issues, a court held that this was a trespass onto the
company's server, which entitled the company to deny the critical exemployee access to the company's email. 41 It appears that whenever a
court analyzes a denial of access to computer technology in terms of
trespass, by framing the issue as analogous to real property containing
more or less clearly defined boundaries, the court is already predisposed
to adopt a mental picture of boundary-crossing defendants who are prima
facie guilty of trespass onto plaintiffs fee simple. However, perhaps the
greatest difference between land and intellectual property is that the
latter does not offer the kind of clear physical boundaries generally
present in the traditional trespass case. It is the very issue of how to set
the more intangible boundary of the intellectual property right that is
really in dispute. So if one is dragged into thinking in these overly literal
terms involving trespass, we should at least be aware that technical
trespass law also contains public interest limitations on private property
rights in the forms of public easements or the defense of necessity. These
terms often express presumptions about the importance of carving out of
the trespass doctrine exceptions that protect public space or public ways
from the total control of private property owners.42 If the trespass
analogy applies to intellectual property, the public interest limitations
should also apply.
The explosion of interest in intellectual property during the past
twenty years has also created an intellectual explosion in law schools.
Beyond raising difficult questions about how to apply legal categories to
rapidly changing technology, it is also producing an intellectual
explosion over theories of property that last took place almost one
hundred years ago. It has reopened a discussion that the Legal Realists
began during the 1920s about the socially constructed character of
property rights.43 In a word, the Legal Realists persuaded a generation of
scholars that property rights are not natural rights but rather socially
created privileges established for social purposes.

40. Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 244, 247-52 (Ct. App. 2001), rev'd, 71 P.3d 296
(Cal. 2003).
41. Id. at 252, 255.
42. See Joseph L. Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149 (1971);
Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention,
68 MICH. L. REv. 471,475-76 (1970).
43. See, e.g., Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8 (1927).
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The advocate of expanded access to technology faces a difficult
challenge. In an era in which science and technology have demonstrated
a fantastic ability to create and to innovate, it is not easy to resist the
argument that innovation requires unrestricted incentives in the form of
property rights.
But the history of technology also demonstrates the ways in which
those who were awarded monopolies through copyright, patent, or
trademark sought to extend their advantages beyond the time period and
privileges they were granted. The recent profligate extension of
copyright protection bears little relationship to creating future
incentives." Instead, it needs to be seen as a triumph of interest group
politics. The pharmaceutical companies use every questionable device to
extend their patents and intimidate generic drug companies. The
pharmaceutical example illustrates a more general point about the
process of granting property rights. It enormously strengthens the market
power of first entrants who continue to exercise disproportionate market
power even after their monopolies expire.

44. See Eldred v. Asheroft, 537 U.S. 186, 194 (2003) (upholding this extension).
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